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A B S T R A C T
Scales measuring procrastination focus on different aspects of unnecessary and unwanted delay, delay in task
implementation – an increased gap between intention and action – being a core characteristic. However, an
inspection of existing procrastination scales reveals that the scales do not distinguish between two facets of
implemental delay, onset delay, and delay related to sustained goal striving. We trace this failure to an imprecise
understanding of “delay,” another core concept in procrastination. This paper discusses the relationship between
onset and sustained delay in procrastination, and then describes a new scale attempting to measure these two
facets of task implementation. In two studies (aggregated N = 465) we demonstrate, using exploratory and
confirmatory factor analysis, that although onset and sustained action procrastination measures correlate, they
are still separate facets of implemental procrastination. Problems with onset delay seem to be particularly im-
portant, increasingly so in high procrastinators. Implications, as well as suggestions for further research, are
discussed.
1. Measuring implemental delay in procrastination: Separating
onset vs. sustained goal striving
Motivated behavior extends over time. Following a decision, the
individual must plan how to implement it, then follows goal striving or
implementation, and finally goal attainment if successful (e.g.,
Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2018). People may procrastinate – delay un-
necessarily – in all these stages (e.g., Svartdal & Steel, 2017), and scales
have been developed to measure procrastination in each. For example,
the Decisional Procrastination Scale (DPS, Mann, 1982, unpublished;
Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997) focuses on delay in decision-
making and onset of implementation. General procrastination scales,
such as the General Procrastination Scale (GPS; Lay, 1986) address
various examples of implemental delay. Finally, McCown and Johnson's
Adult Inventory of Procrastination Scale (AIP; McCown, Johnson, &
Petzel, 1989) includes items related to promptness, meeting deadlines,
and timeliness.
A closer inspection of the procrastination literature reveals, how-
ever, that although implemental delay is a key feature of the procras-
tination problem (e.g., Klingsieck, 2013; Steel, 2010), this core concept
has rarely been explicated in the procrastination literature. By defini-
tion, procrastination is a dysfunctional delay of intended behavior, with
procrastinators tending to demonstrate larger intention-action gaps
compared to non-procrastinators (e.g., Steel, Brothen, & Wambach,
2001). However, as reviewed by Sheeran and Webb (2016), the in-
tention-action gap addresses three rather distinct phases of goal pursuit
– initiation, maintenance, and close when the goal has been attained.
Sheeran and Webb noted that different factors are involved when
problems occur in these phases. For example, failure to get started may
be rooted in factors such as forgetting to start, indecision about means,
second thoughts, and failure to engage in preparatory behaviors. On the
other hand, not keeping goal pursuit on track relates to factors such as
failure to monitor goal progress, competing goals, bad habits, disruptive
thoughts and feelings, and low willpower. In support, Steel and
Weinhardt (2018) adopt a similar three-stage model for their Goal
Phase System and note that the motivational forces operating during
the beginning of a goal are not necessarily the same as those later,
particularly during goal-striving or realization. For example, high ex-
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pectancy or confidence assists the initial goal choice but can have a
negative effect during goal-striving as those overconfident in their
abilities may underinvest in allocation of time and resources. Similarly,
impulsiveness can have a neutral or positive effect with goal choice,
interacting with extrinsic rewards, but often hampers goal striving until
just before deadlines.1
Unfortunately, the procrastination literature seems to have focused
primarily on delay in goal pursuit initiation, often neglecting that
procrastination manifests itself also in goal maintenance pursuit (cf.
Gollwitzer, 2014). One reason for this situation may be that delay – a
defining criterion for procrastination – is ambiguous. Often, “delay” is
used as a temporal judgment of unnecessary delay (e.g., as in item 2 in
the DPS, “Even after I make a decision I delay acting upon it”), and
some seem to restrict procrastination to such cases (Tice, Bratslavsky, &
Baumeister, 2001, p. 63). However, “delay” is also used in another
meaning, referring to indirect delays as a result of impulsive diversions
and other forms of wasting time during intention implementation (as in
item 12, GPS, “In preparing for some deadline, I often waste time by
doing other things”). We argue that both usages are legitimate, but that
the first seems to be the default interpretation whereas the second has
often been overlooked in the procrastination literature, and especially
so in scales measuring procrastination. In the next paragraph, we ex-
pand on these two arguments. Then we present, in two studies, a new
scale attempting to measure two facets of implemental delay, onset
delay, and delay in sustained goal striving.
1.1. On “delay” as used in defining the procrastination construct
Procrastination is defined by two core characteristics, the first being
the delay of some intended behavior, the second that this delay is
chosen despite realizing the negative consequences of the delay
(Klingsieck, 2013; Steel, 2007). The latter criterion implies that pro-
crastination is “irrational” in the sense that the individual acts against
better judgment, often referred to as akrasia (Andreou & White, 2010).
This understanding of procrastination implies that internal norms and
cognitive-affective evaluations of delay play an important role in
identifying procrastination (Milgram & Naaman, 1996;
van Eerde, 2000). Furthermore, procrastination must be distinguished
from rational forms of delay, as many forms of delay of intended be-
havior may be adaptive, rational, and beneficial.
Importantly, a definition of procrastination in terms of delay despite
better judgment may leave the impression that all forms of procrasti-
nation are defined in terms of timing. Given a model of goal-directed
action flow from deliberation → planning → action → evaluation (e.g.,
Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2018), timing would primarily be relevant in
the transitions between deliberation and decision (decisional procras-
tination), between intention formation and intention realization (the
intention-action gap), and finally in goal attainment (e.g., timeliness).
In these cases, unnecessary or irrational delay may be observed in ac-
cordance with the above definition. However, many instances of in-
tended acts unfold over longer periods where dilatory behaviors may
manifest themselves in ways that create indirect delays in goal striving,
yet without involving delays according to temporal criteria. First,
engaging in competing activities may delay goal-directed behavior in
an indirect way, as less time – and less adequate time – is spent on the
prioritized goal activity (cf. Lay, 1986, Study II). Accordingly, several
scales contain items addressing preference for other activities, as for
example the GPS (Lay, 1986) item 1 (“In preparation for some deadline,
I often waste time by doing other things”) and the IPS (Steel, 2010) item
4 (“When I should be doing one thing, I will do another).” Note that for
these items there is no mention of delay per se; delay in goal im-
plementation results from engaging in competing activities. Accord-
ingly, experience sampling of procrastination (e.g., Pychyl, Lee,
Thibodeau, & Blunt, 2000, Table 1) focuses on activities that people
actually do at the moment (e.g., watching TV) versus what they should
have been doing (e.g., studying), defining “procrastination” as doing
something other than what one should do. Second, a closely related
variant of diversion during goal-striving occurs when goal-directed
behavior is impulsively diverted to more tempting situational alter-
natives, indirectly creating delays in realizing goals (Schouwenburg,
1995; Steel, 2007; Steel, Svartdal, Thundiyil, Brothen, 2018). Such
impulsive diversions may address distractions and temptations that are
available to the individual, and susceptibility to them indicate present-
bias preferences characteristic of procrastinators (Steel et al., 2018).
Examples include giving in to more pleasurable alternatives compared
to continued goal striving (e.g., watching TV instead of reading), dys-
functional forms of mood-regulation (Sirois & Pychyl, 2013; Tice &
Bratslavsky, 2000), and escape/avoidance from something aversive
(e.g., escaping from a stressful or boring task). Such forms of delay
reduce the amount of time spent on focal tasks (e.g., Tice et al., 2001,
Experiment 3). Finally, procrastination during goal-striving may result
from other overlapping factors, such as poor self-monitoring, competing
goals, dysfunctional habits, poorly formulated goal intentions, low
willpower, concentration problems, tiredness, and task aversion
(Gollwitzer, 2014; Schouwenburg, 1995; Sheeran & Webb, 2016;
Steel et al., 2018). Also, note that a conception of procrastination as a
breakdown in self-regulation (Steel, 2007) implies that much of the
procrastination problem expresses itself during the goal-striving phase.
Concluding from these examples, we suggest that “delay,” although
being a core criterion for procrastination, has remained inadequately
clarified in the procrastination literature. Whereas some forms of pro-
crastination are easily identifiable according to strict temporal criteria,
others are less so and satisfy the delay criterion only indirectly.
Interestingly, Lay (1986), defined procrastination as “the tendency to
postpone that which is necessary to reach some goal” (p. 457), implying
that procrastination does not refer to a single act of delay, but to a
tendency demonstrated over time to delay goal-relevant acts. In effect,
is seems to be important to recognize that procrastination is a dynamic
phenomenon unfolding over time, manifesting itself in tendencies to act
in ways that prove suboptimal in attaining goals. Such delays may re-
sult from explicit delays as well as be a by-product of maladaptive
strategies in sustained goal-directed behavior. In both cases, the delays
and strategies must be “irrational” or akratic for them to be regarded as
procrastination.
1.2. How procrastination scales measure different goal phases
The procrastination literature is unclear on the various stages of
intended goal realization, and so are scales attempting to measure
procrastination. They do not distinguish between delays in getting
started (onset delay, defined in terms of a temporal gap between in-
tention formation and relevant goal-striving behavior) and failures in
keeping goal pursuit on track (delays created in indirect ways during
goal-striving). We examined 18 procrastination scales to determine
their coverage of these implementation facets. Some scales include
items that address delayed onset, as the DPS (item 2, “Even if I make a
decision I delay acting upon it”), the GPS (item 1, “I often find myself
performing tasks that I had intended to do days before”), and the
Unintentional Procrastination Scale (UPS,(item 1, “I rarely begin tasks
1 Note that goal phases corresponding to the two discussed are well docu-
mented in motivation research. For example, Lewin et al. (1944) posited two
stages: Goal setting, where we deliberate and establish goals we will pursue,
and goal striving. Later models contain these two or more. For example,
Kruglanski et al. (2000) divide action orientation into two phases, an assess-
ment phase, and a locomotion or doing mode. Kanfer (2012) made a very si-
milar distinction. Diefendorff and Lord (2008) and O'Reilly et al. (2014) ap-
proached this issue from a neuroscience perspective. O'Reilly et al. attempted to
establish the number of goal phases, and again suggested two primary phases:
Goal selection, and goal engagement. These authors argued that these states
have “strongly dissociable properties” (p. 4) and hence should be modeled se-
parately.
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as soon as I am given them, even if I intend to;” Fernie et al, 2017). In
contrast, very few scales address issues during goal-striving that may
create unnecessary delay in more indirect ways. One exception is the
Academic Procrastination State Inventory (APSI; Schouwenburg, 1995).
The APSI asks respondents to indicate how “frequently last week did
you engage in the following behaviors or thoughts,” listing a number of
examples related to disruption of goal striving (e.g., “Gave up studying
because you did not feel well, ” Drifted off into daydreams while
studying,” and “Experienced concentration problems when studying”).
However, this scale also contains items not addressing sustained goal
striving (e.g., “Forgot to prepare things for studying”). Items in this
scale were intended to cover the three important facets of procrasti-
nation according to Schouwenburg, 1995, lack of immediacy in inten-
tions and behavior, a discrepancy between intention and behavior, and
a preference for competing activities, and were not intended to measure
failure of goal striving per se (cf. also Patzelt & Opitz, 2014). Other
scales may address procrastination during sustained goal striving but
are ambiguous as to whether they also refer to onset delay. For ex-
ample, the GPS item 12 “In preparation for some deadline, I often waste
time by doing other things” may refer both to initiation and sustained
goal striving. This ambiguity also applies to the two IPS items discussed
(IPS 2, “If there is something I should do, I get to it before attending to
lesser tasks” - R), and IPS 4, “When I should be doing one thing, I will
do another”).
Table 1 summarizes items from existing procrastination scales that
address delays in onset and sustained goal striving2. As is seen from the
table, we have found only one scale addressing delay during goal
striving, and this scale is intended for use in academic settings.
Fig. 1 illustrates the phases of intended action, separating the im-
plementation phase in onset versus sustained goal striving (cf. Sheeran
& Webb, 2016). As is indicated in Fig. 2, procrastination in these phases
may take different forms, and measuring them independently may be
important. For example, delayed onset implies that effort during sus-
tained goal striving must be increased if a task is to be completed within
a fixed timeframe (e.g., Steel et al., 2018, Fig. 1). In this case, even
though the onset and sustained action procrastination measures may be
positively correlated, slow onset in high procrastinators predicts lower
sustained procrastination because slow starters must catch up to finish
in time. Another issue of interest is which of the two facets of pro-
crastination – slow onset and delays in sustained goal striving – best
predict overall procrastination score. If, as suggested, delayed onset is
compensated by increased effort during goal striving, one may suspect
that onset delay is a main determinant of overall procrastination. Fi-
nally, as procrastination implies reduced time spent on important tasks
(Lay, 1986; Tice et al., 2001), one may ask whether reduced time can be
traced to late onset, to impulsive diversions during goal striving, or to
both. Given the compensation hypothesis discussed, it is likely that
onset delay may be the best predictor of reduced time spent on im-
portant tasks.
1.3. Conceptual framework for three facets of procrastination
1.3.1. Onset delay
As seen in Table 1, the GPS (Lay, 1986) contains two items ad-
dressing implemental delay, the DPS (Mann, 1982) one. Both items are
included in the Pure Procrastination Scale (PPS; Steel, 2010; 6 and 8,
from the GPS; 2 from the DPS). Furthermore, the Aitken Procrastination
Inventory (API; Aitken, 1982) contains seven items explicitly addres-
sing onset delay (e.g., “Even when I know a job needs to be done, I
never want to start right away”; “It often takes me a long time to get
started on something”). Finally, the Volitional Components Inventory /
Volitional Components Questionnaire (VCI/VCQ (Kuhl &
Fuhrmann, 1998) contains four items addressing swift action when
action possibility presents itself, thus being inconsistent with delayed
onset (e.g., “When something needs to be done I start without hesi-
tating,” “When a task needs to be done, I like to do it right away”). Most
of these items address onset delay (or the opposite), but they generally
fail to address two important features of procrastination, delay in the
context of an explicit intention, and general delay versus procrastina-
tion. Hence, we slightly modified some items (marked in italics in
Table 2) to reflect intentions and akratic delay. The authors discussed a
Table 1
Procrastination items covering onset and sustained goal striving in existing scales.
1 I often find myself performing tasks that I had intended to do days before. GPS ONSET
9 I generally delay before starting on work I have to do. GPS ONSET
2 Even after I make a decision I delay acting upon it DPS ONSET
1 I delay starting things until the last minute. API ONSET
3 Even when I know a job needs to be done, I never want to start it right away. API ONSET
8 I delay starting things so long I don't get them done by the deadline. API ONSET
10 It often takes me a long time to get started on something. API ONSET
11 I don't delay when I know I really need to get the job done. (R) API ONSET
12 If I had an important project to do, I'd get started on it as quickly as possible. (R) API ONSET
15 I get right to work at jobs that need to be done. (R) API ONSET
1 I rarely begin tasks as soon as I am given them, even if I intend to. UPS ONSET
2 Allowed yourself to be distracted from your work APSI SUST
5 Drifted off into daydreams while studying APSI SUST
7 Experienced concentration problems when studying APSI SUST
8 Gave up when studying was not going well APSI SUST
10 Interrupted studying for a while in order to do other things APSI SUST
12 Gave up on studying early in order to do more pleasant things APSI SUST
14 Studied the subject matter that you had planned to do (R) APSI SUST
15 Felt, when studying, that you disliked the subject APSI SUST
Note. GPS = General Procrastination Scale; DPS = Decisional Procrastination Scale; AIP = Aitken Procrastination Inventory; APSI = Academic Procrastination State
Inventory; UIP = Unintentional Procrastination Scale. Item numbers refer to item numbers in the original scales.
Fig. 1. Phases of intended action.
2 A list of items (> 175) from 18 procrastination scales is available from the
corresponding author.
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pool of 18 possible items and selected, based on content analysis, six
items for use (Table 2). The two first items are from the GPS (also used
in the PPS) and may serve as a benchmark for the other onset items, as
they have proven successful in numerous studies of implemental delays
(e.g., Svartdal & Steel, 2017).
1.3.2. Sustained goal pursuit delay
As discussed, whereas onset delay primarily relates to a timing
criterion (“I will start tomorrow, not today”) or prioritizing (“I will do X
rather than Y, even if both are possible”), sustained goal striving relates
to commitment and having the necessary time, focus, and energy to
implement intentions over time. For aversive and boring tasks, other
alternatives become tempting, and especially so when one gets tired,
and exhaustion may result if the task is demanding, also increasing the
likelihood of being tempted to do other and more attractive things
(Steel et al. 2018). Hence, procrastination in this action phase may
relate to, among other things, tiredness, exhaustion, focus (being dis-
tracted), temptations, nature of task (difficult, boring), tasks decided by
others, taking a break to escape for a while, give in after minor set-
backs, dislike hard work, typically not finish tasks, change one's mind,
and others (e.g., Schouwenburg, 1995). Table 3 lists the items selected
for the present studies. All were custom made for this study, but several
were inspired by items in the APSI scale (Schouwenburg, 1995).
1.3.3. Delay in reaching the intended goal
Finally, to cover the end of goal pursuit, we included items to
Fig. 2. Relations between onset and sustained action delay.
Table 2
Onset delay items used in this study.
1 Even after I make a decision I delay acting upon it DPS / PPS
2 I generally delay before starting on work I have to do GPS / PPS
3 I delay starting things until the last minute, even when I intended to start earlier API / CUST
4 Often I start so late that I miss the deadline API / CUST
5 Even after I have made a decision, I delay acting upon it for no specific reason DPS /CUST
6 When I am to start tasks I planned to do, I often end up doing something else instead CUST
Note. DPS = Decisional Procrastination Scale; PPS = Pure Procrastination Scale; GPS = General
Procrastination Scale; API = Aitken Procrastination Inventory; CUST= Custom item (specific costumizations in
italics).
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measure meeting deadlines and timeliness (Table 4). Appropriate items
are found in existing scales, especially in the AIP; (McCown et al., 1989;
Svartdal & Steel, 2017). We also added custom items.
1.4. The present studies
Study 1 assessed items purporting to measure different facets of
procrastination (Tables 2–4) using exploratory factor analysis (EFA),
both for item functioning as well as for factor structure, the overall
expectation being that items would organize into a three-factor solution
- onset, sustained goal striving, and timeliness. Study 2 further examined
these items using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), testing the factor
structure as suggested by Study 1.
Having established measures of onset procrastination versus sus-
tained goal striving procrastination, we compared these measures
against a well-established procrastination scale, the Irrational
Procrastination Scale (IPS; Steel, 2010). This scale correlates highly
with other general procrastination scales (Svartdal & Steel, 2017,
Table 7). We expected for these data that the three facets of procras-
tination would correlate moderately to highly with the IPS score, and –
as discussed – that the onset subscale would demonstrate an especially
close relationship to overall procrastination score.
Next, as delayed onset narrows the timeframe available for task
completion, we examined the relations between the onset and sustained
procrastination measures. Although these measures should correlate
rather highly, a “compensation” hypothesis predicts that individuals
delaying onset must work even harder to complete tasks in time. Hence,
high procrastinators should demonstrate high onset procrastination
scores but relatively lower scores on the sustained goal striving pro-
crastination measure, whereas the opposite pattern should be observed
in non-procrastinators.
In both studies, we also administered a simplified model of a typical
task completion sequence based on the model presented in Fig. 1 and
asked participants to indicate the perceived difficulty associated with
each stage. Task difficulty is associated with procrastination
(Steel, 2007), and this procedure therefore served as an independent
measure of problems associated with the various phases of intended
action. Here we expected that the onset phase would be especially
prone to be perceived as difficult, and especially so with increasing
overall procrastination score.
Finally, we measured self-reported time spent on self-directed aca-
demic work. An overall expectation is that procrastination limits the
time available on a given project (Lay, 1986), suggesting a negative
correlation between self-directed academic work and procrastination
score. Note that direct and indirect delays have a common effect, as
both limit the time available for goal-directed work. Separating onset
delay and sustained goal striving delay may give an additional per-
spective to this picture, and again we expected onset delay to be par-




The sample comprised 170 students aged 18 to 48, mean
age = 25.56 (SD=5.47). The majority of participants (85.7%) were
females.
2.1.2. Procedure and ethics
Participants were recruited by circulating a survey on mailing lists
and social media at several universities and high schools in Norway. All
were informed that participation was voluntary and anonymous and
that they could withdraw from the study at any time. Participants were
given information about the purpose of the study together with a link to
the online survey (www.qualtrics.com) and gave informed consent by
pressing a “start the survey” button. The current project is a part of a
larger project on procrastination, which has ethical approval from the
Regional Ethical Board in Tromsø, Norway (REK nord 2014/2313).
2.1.3. Material
The item sets shown in Tables 3–5 were presented sequentially and
rated on a 5-point Likert scale with higher scores indicating increasing
agreement. Then the survey presented a simplified model of a typical
task completion based on the model presented in Fig. 1 and asked
participants to indicate, on a 1-5 scale, the perceived difficulty asso-
ciated with each stage. Finally, all responded to the six-item version of
the IPS (Svartdal & Steel, 2017). The original IPS (Steel, 2010) features
nine items, of which three are reversed. In the six-item version, the
reversed items are deleted. Both versions demonstrate good internal
consistency, α = .85–.93, and the full and reduced versions correlate
highly. All scale items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, with higher
scores indicating more procrastination.
2.1.4. Analysis
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was employed using principal axis
factoring. An eigenvalue > 1 and the scree plot test were used to de-
termine underlying factors. An oblique rotation (oblimin) was applied
since the extracted factors were expected to be correlated. Analyses
were performed in IBM SPSS statistics 25.
2.2. Results and discussion
The EFA was appropriate as indicated by a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy of above 0.906 and a highly
significant Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (p<0.001). The initial EFA
analysis produced three underlying factors onset, sustain, and timeliness,
Table 3
Goal pursuit delay items used in this study.
1 When I work on important tasks, I often quit sooner than I should CUST (APSI 12)
2 When working on tasks, I often have to force myself to continue CUST
3 I cannot work on tasks for longer periods at a time CUST (APSI 12)
4 I shift attention frequently away from the task I am working on CUST (APSI 2, 7)
5 When working on a task, I find myself browsing and reading irrelevant sites CUST
6 I am easily captured by other things – skip doing what I intended to do CUST (APSI 10)
7 I can attend to other things (mail, FB, etc.) while doing academic work CUST
Note. APSI = Academic Procrastination State Inventory. CUST = custom item. Custom items inspired by other scales
indicated in parentheses.
Table 4
Delay in reaching intended goals items used in this study.
1 I get short of time CUST
2 I cannot meet deadlines CUST (AIP)
3 I am not very good at keeping deadlines AIP
4 When I work on a task, I typically finish before others CUST
5 I am often delayed CUST
6 I lag behind on study work CUST
Note. AIP = Adult Inventory of Procrastination Scale. CUST = custom item
(one inspired by the AIP).
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as indicated by eigenvalues above 1 (8.71, 1.89 and 1.50) and the scree
plot, confirming our overall expectation of the factor structure.
Six items were reexamined based on low factor loadings and/or
double loadings, resulting in deletion: Onset items 4 (“Often I start so
late that I miss the deadline”) and 6 (“When I am to start tasks I planned
to do, I often end up doing something else instead”) demonstrated
double loadings on the onset and timeliness subscales. Sustain item 7 (“I
can work on other things (check mail, FB, and so on) while doing
academic work”) was deleted due to low factor loading. The timeliness
item 1 (“I get short of time”) produced a double loading on onset and
timeliness subscales. Item 5, suggested to measure timeliness (“When I
work on an assignment, I typically finish before others”), loaded mainly
on onset. Finally, “I lag behind on study work” produced a double
loading on onset and timeliness.
We then repeated the EFA with the 13 items retained. Again, three
factors with eigenvalues > 1 (5.86, 1.63, and 1.42) appeared, ac-
counting for 68.5% of the variance. The oblimin rotated loadings for
each of the retained items are reported in Table 5. In conclusion, these
data support a three-factor model, separating the two implemental fa-
cets onset and sustained goal striving, as well as confirming that
timeliness is a separate facet of procrastination (e.g., Svartdal &
Steel, 2017).
Table 6 presents means and correlations between the three sub-
scales, the IPS, and difficulty ratings of the action phases. As expected,
the onset subscale correlated highly (r = .80), with the IPS, whereas
correlations were lower for the other subscales.
To assess the relation between the onset and sustained procrasti-
nation scores to general procrastination, a regression with IPS score as
the dependent variable and subscale scores as predictors indicated that
only onset scores significantly predicted IPS score, β = .70 (p<.001),
whereas the sustained and timeliness subscales did not, β = .12 and
β = .10, respectively. Hence, onset procrastination seems to be the
better predictor of general procrastination, consistent with it being the
first factor extracted.
To further assess the relation between the two facet measures and
general procrastination, we performed an ANOVA with the procrasti-
nation facets as dependent variables and IPS levels (IPS levels 1-5 as
defined by the individual's absolute IPS score) as a categorical pre-
dictor. As argued, the expectation for these data was that both onset
and sustained scores should increase with increased levels of general
procrastination, but that this change would be especially pronounced in
the onset measure and less so in the sustained measure. The ANOVA
indicated an overall significant effect, F(4, 164) = 53.70, p < .001,
η2 = .57, reflecting that both facet scores increased with increasing IPS
levels. Importantly, the interaction effect was significant, F(4,
164) = 7.40, p < .001, η2 = .15, indicating that onset problems es-
calated more than sustained goal striving problems over increasing
general procrastination levels. These results are displayed in Fig. 3 (left
panel). Note in this figure also that timeliness scores increase only
modestly over increasing IPS levels, and whereas overall onset and
sustained procrastination means were quite similar (2.74 and 2.83), the
overall timeliness mean was significantly lower (1.63), F(2,
328) = 135.06, p < .001, η2 = .54.
Fig. 3 (right panel) shows the mean problem ratings for the four task
completion phases over different procrastination levels. Difficulty rat-
ings increased with increasing procrastination levels, F(4,
163) = 32.38, p < .001, η2 = .44. In addition, the phase * procrasti-
nation level interaction was significant, F(12, 489) = 2.10, p = .015,
η2 = .05, reflecting that onset scores were especially sensitive to overall
procrastination levels. Table 6 displays the correlations between the
mean onset, sustained, and procrastination scores and action phase
difficulty ratings. Notably, both the onset and sustained procrastination
scores correlated highly, r = .67, with their corresponding difficulty
ratings in the onset and sustained action phases.
Finally, the relation between time spent on self-directed academic
work and procrastination score (IPS) was negative, rS = -.33. The onset
score correlated somewhat higher with academic work, rS = -.38, the
sustained lower, rS = -.22, indicating again that onset problems con-
tribute more to reduced time available for academic work.
3. Study 2
Study 2 was performed as replication of Study 1, allowing for the
use of CFA on a sufficiently large independent sample.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
The sample comprised 295 students between the ages of 19 to 55,
mean age = 26.28 (SD=7.56) years. The majority of participants
(82%) were females.
Table 5
Oblique (oblimin) rotated factor loadings.
Items Onset Sustain Timeliness
1 Even after I make a decision I delay acting upon it -0.746
2 I generally delay before starting on work I have to do -0.915
3 I delay starting things until the last minute, even when I intended to start earlier -0.759
5 Even after I have made a decision, I delay acting upon it for no specific reason -0.872
1 When I work on important tasks, I often quit sooner than I should 0.634
2 When working on tasks, I often have to force myself to continue 0.745
3 I cannot work on tasks for longer periods at a time 0.762
4 I shift attention frequently away from the task I am working on 0.886
5 When working on a task, I find myself browsing and reading irrelevant sites 0.675
6 I am easily captured by other things – skip doing what I intended to do -0.255 0.583
2 I cannot meet deadlines 0.675
3 I am not very good at keeping deadlines 0.883
5 I lam often delayed 0.438
Note: All loadings significant, p < .01. Coefficients <.15 are suppressed.
Table 6
Descriptive data and correlations for the onset, sustained, and timeliness sub-
scales, the IPS, as well as the difficulty ratings of the action phases.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. ONSET 2.91 .99 1
2. SUSTAIN 2.94 .85 .53 1
3. TIMELINESS 1.65 .71 .40 .40 1
4. IPS 3.17 1.02 .80 .54 .43 1
5. STAGE1 2.68 1.05 .34 38 .08 ns .36 1
6. STAGE2 3.43 1.10 .67 .49 .31 .66 .41 1
7. STAGE3 2.77 0.98 .41 .67 .30 .48 .27 .40 1
8. STAGE4 2.54 1.12 .43 .42 .38 .53 .21 .36 .50
Note: All correlations significant, p<.01; M=Mean; SD=Standard deviation;
IPS=Irrational Procrastination Scale.
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3.1.2. Procedure and ethics
Participants were recruited by circulating the survey by email and
on social media using assistants at several universities throughout
Norway. See Study 1 for procedure and ethics information.
3.1.3. Material
The material was identical to that of Study 1, except that the
timeliness item 2 was not included in the data collection3. Hence, only
two items were specified as indicators of the timeliness factor. The
onset and sustain factors had four and six indicators, respectively,
corresponding to those used in Study 1.
3.1.4. Analysis
CFA was employed using two estimators, robust maximum like-
lihood estimation (MLR) due to deviation from normality, and robust
weighted least square (WLSMv) that is appropriate for ordinal data and
relatively smaller samples (Kline, 2016, p. 326). Model fit to data was
examined using standard fit indices (Brown, 2015), specifically the
comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the root-
mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), and standardized root-
mean-square residual (SRMR). An RMSEA less than 0.05, CFI and TLI
values greater than 0.95, and SRMR less than 0.05 represent a well-
fitting model. RMSEA as high as .08 indicates a reasonable fit, whereas
RMSEA values ranging from .08 to .10 indicate mediocre fit and esti-
mates above .10 indicate poor fit (Browne & Cudek, 1993;
MacCallum et al., 1996). In evaluating the models, we conducted chi-
square difference tests. When conducting chi-square difference tests
using the MLR estimator, it is necessary to adjust the chi-square using
the Satorra-Bentler scaling correction (for details, see Bryant &
Satorra, 2012). When using the estimator for categorical data (i.e.,
WLSMV), the difference test procedure using chi-square is applied (for
details, see Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010). Analyses were performed
with Mplus version 8.3.
Fig. 3. Subscale ratings over different levels of IPS levels (left panel); Difficulty ratings over the four planned action phases over different IPS levels (right panel).
3 We decided, prior to data collection for Study 2 and prior to data analyses of
Study 1, not to include item 2 because of overlap with item 4.
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3.2. Results and discussion
First, the fit of a three-factor model was compared to a single-factor
model. As seen in Table 1 (Appendix), the single-factor model produced
a poor fit across estimators. The three-factor model had a good fit with
the WLSMv considering CFI>.95, TLI>.95, and SRMR<.05, and a
mediocre fit considering RMSEA=0.087, whereas MLR produced rea-
sonable fit (i.e., CFI>.90, TLI>.90, SRMR=.052) and mediocre fit
(i.e., RMSEA=0.082). The chi-square difference tests indicated support
for the three-factor model (WLSMv Chi-square difference = 209.986,
df=3, p<0.001; MLR Chi-square difference 250.361, df=3, p<0.001).
Second, based on modification indices, errors of sustain items 1 and 4
were correlated with sustain item 2 and 3, and sustain item 2 was
correlated with sustain item 3. In both cases, these steps were reason-
able, as these items demonstrate considerable overlap in meaning. Both
the single-factor and three-factor models were modified, resulting in a
well-fitting three-factor model and a poor-fitting single-factor model
with both estimators. Again, a chi-square difference test was employed
yielding support for the three-factor model (i.e., WLSMv: chi-square
diff=192.973, df=3, p<0.001; MLR chi-square diff=197.566, df=3,
p<0.001). Finally, an alternative model with sustain item 3 removed
(because of high similarity to sustain item 2) produced an even better fit
using both estimators (see Table 1, Appendix). Again, based on mod-
ification indices using both estimators, errors of sustain item 3 was
correlated with sustain item 1 and 5. This modified model produced
excellent fit with the WLSMv (χ2 = 53.77, df=39, p=0.058;
CFI=0.997; TLI=0.995; RMSEA=0.025, and SRMR=0.025) and with
the MLR (χ2 = 41.61, df=39, p=0.358; CFI=0.998; TLI=0.997;
RMSEA=0.016 and SRMR=0.029). Thus, the CFA confirmed the re-
sults of Study 1 supporting a three-factor model. The result of the CFA
(MLR) is presented in Fig. 4 (left panel).
As noted, in Study 1 only onset score significantly predicted overall
procrastination score (IPS). Fig. 4 (right panel) displays the corre-
sponding analysis for the present study, using SEM to model how the
three subscales predict IPS score. The model demonstrated a good fit,
CFI=0.974; TIL=0.968; RMSEA=0.041(90%CI 0.033 – 0.058);
SRMR=0.041. As is seen from the figure, onset significantly predicted
IPS score, β = .68, whereas the two other subscales demonstrated
substantially lower but still significant beta values, β = .18 (sustain)
and .16 (timeliness).
Table 7 presents means and correlations between the three subscales
and the IPS. The results were similar to those of Study 1, the onset
subscale correlating highly (r = .80) with IPS, and lower correlations
for the other subscales.
The relation between the facet measures and general procrastina-
tion demonstrated similar patterns as those observed in Study 1. First,
the ANOVA indicated an overall significant effect of the onset and
sustained procrastination facets over increasing levels of IPS, F(4,
223) = 69.99, p < .001, η2 = .56. Second, as in Study 1, the onset *
sustained interaction was significant, F(4, 223) = 6.78, p < .001,
η2 = .11, reflecting that onset problems escalated more than sustained
goal striving problems over increasing general procrastination levels.
These results are displayed in Fig. 5 (left panel).4 The timeliness scores
increased over increasing IPS levels, but levels were lower compared to
the onset and sustained procrastination scores. Overall onset and sus-
tained procrastination means were quite similar (2.86 and 2.92),
whereas the overall timeliness mean was significantly lower (2.43), F(2,
446) = 18.13, p < .001, η2 = .08.
The problem ratings for the four task completion phases over dif-
ferent procrastination levels demonstrated similar results as those of
Study 1, see Fig. 5, right panel. First, difficulty scores increased with
increasing procrastination levels, F(3, 223) = 44.49, p < .001,
η2 = .37. Second, the phase * procrastination level interaction was
significant, F(9, 669) = 5.70, p < .001, η2 = .07, demonstrating that
onset scores were especially prone to increase as a function of general
procrastination (IPS) levels.
The relation between time spent on self-directed academic work and
IPS score was negative, rS = -.28. Again, the onset score correlated
somewhat higher with academic work time, rS = -.40, the sustained
lower, rS = -.18, indicating that onset problems contribute more to
reduced time available for academic work.
4. General discussion
The distinction between delayed onset and disruptions during goal-
striving is well established (e.g., Sheeran & Webb, 2016). Whereas the
first primarily relates to timing and manifests itself directly in terms of
later onset, delay in sustained goal striving occurs in a variety of direct
and indirect ways. Thus, while delayed onset may address the proto-
typical instance of procrastination, the Latin procrastinus literally re-
ferring to something “belonging to tomorrow,” failure to stay on track
toward a goal may be rooted in a variety of disruptive factors, indirectly
creating delay in goal striving. The latter facet of procrastination is
rarely addressed in procrastination research, nor in scale construction.
The lack of procrastination scales to address both facets of implemental
procrastination is unfortunate, even more so because this circumstance
reflects an insufficient understanding of the phenomenon in procrasti-
nation literature. The present paper attempted to theoretically differ-
entiate the two facets and to present a scale to measure them. The scale
proposed in the present paper explicitly addresses two phases of task
implementation, onset and continued goal striving.
Results of Study 1 suggested a three-factor structure corresponding
to the suggested constructs onset delay, delay during goal striving, and
timeliness. The onset delay measure correlated highly with a standard
measure of general procrastination (IPS; Steel, 2010), whereas the two
other measures demonstrated lower correlations with the IPS. Study 2
replicated the first study with a larger sample, allowing for a specific
test using CFA of the factor structure. The results confirmed the three-
factor solution identified in Study 1. Correlational analyses repeated the
findings from Study 1, with a high correlation between the IPS and the
onset delay measure, and lower correlations with the sustained goal
striving and timeliness measures.
Both studies indicate support for the specific role of onset delay in
procrastination. Specifically, an analysis of the relations between the
three subscales over different levels of procrastination (as measured by
the IPS) demonstrated that the onset delay means were lower relative to
the sustained means for lower levels of procrastination, whereas for
higher levels of IPS the levels reversed. This shift indicates that onset
delay becomes an increasingly important problem as overall procras-
tination tendencies increase. These results were supported by an in-
dependent measure of perceived difficulties associated with the typical
phases of planned action, decision, getting started, keeping up sus-
tained action, and finishing in time. Again, onset was identified as the
most problematic phase, and especially so by high procrastinators.
Finally, self-reported time spent on self-directed academic work was
correlated with general procrastination score, but higher so with the
onset procrastination measure. In essence, the German saying “Aller
Anfang ist schwer” (“Every beginning is hard”) and the Norwegian
expression “dørstokkmila”(“the doorstep mile”) get a deeper meaning
according to these data, as starting something may be hard for ev-
eryone, and is even harder as overall procrastination tendency in-
creases.
As delayed onset narrows the timeframe available for task com-
pletion, but many tasks have a fixed time frame for completion, the
present data indicate that late onset may be compensated by increased
effort during the sustained goal striving phase. However, working
harder under stricter time regimes fosters stress and suboptimal con-
ditions for work, which, in turn, probably lead to lower academic
achievement if, at all, the task is completed.4 In Fig. 5, eight individuals at IPS level 1 were moved to level 2.
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4.1. Limitations and future research
Our results indicate that onset delay is particularly important in
procrastination, but an alternative interpretation is that procrastination
during goal-striving is more difficult to monitor and hence to report and
measure. Specifically, onset delay is a construct addressing timing,
given an intention to act. Even if there may be various specific reasons
for delaying onset (e.g., indecision about means, second thoughts), the
result as perceived by the actor is a failure to start as intended. In
contrast, delays during task execution may be due to diverse and
complex factors that work indirectly to create delay. For example, low
willpower can make situational temptations appear attractive, causing
impulsive diversions from planned action (e.g., Steel et al., 2018). Al-
though such diversions are themselves detectable, delays in task ex-
ecution because of them may not be equally obvious to the individual.
Hence, as we are notoriously poor at monitoring ourselves attentively
when we attempt to self-regulate (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996),
delays during task pursuit may be more difficult to self-report. Fur-
thermore, the fact that delayed onset often makes it necessary to in-
crease goal striving effort to catch up may indicate to procrastinators
that they work as hard as, or even harder, compared to others, even to
non-procrastinators. Future research should assess these issues, also in
situations that are not compromised by differences in onset (e.g., in
controlled situations examining disruptions in goal striving with no
differences between participants in onset delay, cf. Tice et al., 2001,
Experiment 3).
Turning to the limitations of the study, the sample size used in Study
1 is quite small. However, the factor loadings are generally high (i.e.,
loadings ranging from .44 to .91). Studies have shown that moderate to
high loadings was the major factor in determining reproducibility
(Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). For instance,
Guadagnoli and Velicer (1988) suggested that a sample size of N≥100
was sufficient if four or more variables per factor had loadings above
.60. Further, the present research is based on two student samples,
suggesting that future studies should assess factor structure as well as
relations between onset delay and delay in sustained goal striving in
samples from the general population as well. Such studies should also
assess scale properties over gender, age, and even cultures (e.g.,
Kankaraš & Moors, 2010).
Items used to assess sustained goal striving were inspired by the
work of Schouwenburg, 1995, and would profit from scrutiny and
possibly adding other items. In this respect, a limitation in Study 2 is
Fig. 4. CFA - standardized estimates; Model for subscales predicting IPS, standardized estimates .
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the post-hoc modification to improve the CFA model fit indices. Several
measurement errors were allowed to correlate among indicators of the
sustain-subscale, which, as pointed out by Hermida (2015), moves the
model testing from being confirmatory to becoming an exploratory
analysis. Error correlations are likely due to sampling error, which may
restrict cross-validation of the structure in future studies
(Hermida, 2015; Grant, 1996). Further, the underlying structure may be
masked if a relevant omitted variable is estimated through measure-
ment error (Cortina, 2002; Landis, Edwards, & Cortins, 2009). How-
ever, the model fit of the non-modified three-factor model was gen-
erally in the range of an acceptable fitting model. In particular, the
alternative three-factor model (Appendix, Table 1) produced a good fit
to the data. This again suggests that items would profit from scrutiny
and potentially adding other items, and future research should address
Fig. 4. (continued)
Table 7
Descriptive data and correlations for the onset, sustained, and timeliness sub-
scales, the IPS, as well as the difficulty ratings of action phases.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. ONSET 2.87 1.03 1
2. SUSTAIN 2.95 .86 .57 1
3. TIMEL. 2.41 .92 .44 .42 1
4. IPS 2.99 .97 .80 .60 .58 1
5. STAGE1 2.52 1.07 .26 .31 .34 .34 1
6. STAGE2 3.29 1.07 .66 .46 .44 .70 .28 1
7. STAGE3 2.60 .96 .40 .62 .36 .43 .25 .32 1
8. STAGE4 2.29 1.05 .28 .40 .41 .37 .27 .26 .49
Note: All correlations sig. at p<.01; M=Mean; SD=Standard deviation;
IPS=Irrational Procrastination Scale.
Fig. 5. Subscale ratings over different levels of IPS levels (left panel); Difficulty ratings over the four task completion phases over different IPS levels (right panel).
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cross-validation and replication.
Another limitation of the present research is that we have utilized
only one general procrastination scale, the IPS (Steel, 2010), as a re-
ference. Other scales may demonstrate different relations to the sub-
scales discussed in the present paper, even more so because different
scales focus on different facets of procrastination. Hence, future studies
should include other procrastination scales to verify the close relation
observed between overall procrastination and onset procrastination,
and the relatively weak relation between overall procrastination and
procrastination in the goal-striving phase.
Another important step in validating the differentiation between
onset procrastination and procrastination in the goal-striving phase is to
investigate whether the two facets relate differently to motivational and
volitional variables. As noted, the motivational forces operating during
the beginning of goal pursuit are not necessarily the same as those
important during later goal striving (Steel & Weinhardt, 2018). Thus,
motivational variables, such as expectancies and values, should be re-
lated strongly to onset procrastination, whereas volitional variables,
such as the ability to shield distractions or willpower in general, should
relate more strongly to procrastination in the goal-striving phase. In a
future study, we will relate the scale of the two facets to instruments
measuring the different forms of motivation (as in the Self-Determina-
tion Theory; Deci & Ryan, 2008), strategies of regulation of motivation
(Grunschel, Schwinger, Steinmayr & Fries, 2016), volition (Kuhl, 1984),
and energy (Steel et al., 2018).
Appendix. Table 1.
Model fit for 1-factor and 3-factor models using MLR and WLSMv estimators (Study 2)
Not modified With modificationa Not modified With modificationa Not modified With modificationb







62.72, df=46, p=0.051 76.278, df=41, p<0.001 41.606, df=39, p<0.358
CFI 0.695 0.749 0.938 0.988 0.972 0.998
TLI 0.627 0.818 0.920 0.983 0.963 0.997




0.080 (90%CI 0.065 -
0.096)
0.037 (90%CI 0.000 -
0.058)
0.056 (90%CI 0.036 -
0.076)
0.016 (90%CI 0.000 -
0.046)
SRMR 0.108 0.094 0.052 0.034 0.029 0.029










70.987, df=46, p=0.011 93.316, df=41, p<0.001 53.774, df=39, p=0.058
CFI 0.845 0.877 0.975 0.994 0.988 0.997
TLI 0.810 0.835 0.968 0.991 0.984 0.995
RMSEA 0.212 (90%CI 0.198 -
0.226)
0.198 (90%CI 0.183 -
0.212)
0.087 (90%CI 0.071 -
0.103)
0.045 (90%CI 0.022 -
0.065)
0.069 (90%CI 0.050 -
0.087)
0.037 (90%CI 0.000 -
0.060)
SRMR 0.104 0.088 0.045 0.029 0.033 0.025
Notes. a include error correlations sustain-item 4 with sustain-items:1,3, 5 and sustain 3 with sustain-items 1, 5. b include error correlations sustain-item 3 with
sustain-items 1 and 5. MLR= Robust maximum likelihood; WLSMv=Mean- and variance-adjusted weighted least squares; CFI= comparative fit index; TLI=Tucker-
Lewis index; RMSEA=root-mean square error of approximation; SRMR=standardized root-mean square residual.
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